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THERE IS A THERE THERE: HOW THE ZIPPO SLIDING SCALE HAS
DESTABILIZED THE STRUCTURAL FOUNDATION OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION ANALYSIS
Catherine Ross Dunham*
A classic is classic not because it conforms to certain structural
rules, or fits certain definitions … It is classic because of a certain
eternal and irrepressible freshness. Edith Wharton

I. INTRODUCTION
A. HOW ZIPPO AND ITS PROGENY HAVE DESTABILIZED PERSONAL
JURISDICTION ANALYSIS
In 1997, the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania evaluated one in a line of emerging personal jurisdiction cases
that raised the question of whether Internet-based contacts with citizens of
the forum state can alone establish the defendant purposefully availed
himself of the benefits and protections of the forum state.

In this unlikely

watershed case, Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com,1 the District Court
wrangled with the new concept of purposeful availment through electronic
contact with the forum state. The court viewed Zippo and its antecedents as

*
Catherine Ross Dunham is an Associate Professor of Law at the Elon University
School of Law. The author would like to thank her research assistant, Heather Quinn, for
her invaluable assistance researching this article.
1
Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa
1997).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273709
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components of a new body of personal jurisdiction law: Internet-based
personal jurisdiction. In Zippo, the District Court created a new test, the
Zippo sliding scale, to evaluate the purposeful availment issue when the
defendant’s contacts are based on Internet conduct.

Many courts then

followed Zippo’s impulse to categorize Internet-based contacts differently
than other contacts and applied the sliding scale to a variety of cases
possessing the common thread of Internet activity.
Zippo and its progeny raise the question of to what extent the law should
customize doctrine to address the practical changes created by technological
advances. Courts now stand in a similar position to Courts at the turn of the
Twentieth Century when the country struggled with the realities of
industrialization and cross-country travel. Through Pennoyer,2 then later
through International Shoe,3 courts mediated the tensions between national
growth and the tradition of territoriality through tests based on a defendant’s
contacts with the forum, rather than a defendant’s physical presence in the
forum.

Territoriality, or place, served as the foundation of Twentieth

Century personal jurisdiction jurisprudence and the use of a minimum
contacts analysis formed the analytical structure.
Tensions exist between the role of contacts based on Internet activity
and the foundation and structure created through theories based on place.
2
3

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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The Zippo sliding scale was the Federal District Court’s response to the
tension created by the perceived amelioration of place as a determinant of
contacts and purposeful availment. The Zippo approach responded to a
rising fear that if entities are able to contact citizens of the forum through
the Internet alone, those contacts will fail the test of minimum contacts
because Internet-based contacts can be disseminated so widely, purposeful
availment with any particular forum is non-existent.
This article argues judicial responses such as the Court’s response in
Zippo constitute premature, non-functional and destabilizing reactions to
Internet-based contacts analysis. First, the article argues the Zippo sliding
scale has destabilized the foundation of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
by directing courts to analyze the defendant’s contacts by reference to a
linear scale which serves as a non-functional addition on the existing
foundation. The article further argues the hasty construction of Zippo
creates a new need to shore up the established framework of contacts
analysis based on the place theory directives of International Shoe
andPennoyer. Finally, the article evaluates how place theory fits in the
modern context through the hypothetical analysis of a case wherein a
defendant’s only contacts with the forum are through Internet-based
activity.
II. BACKGROUND
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A. THE ROLE OF PLACE IN PERSONAL JURISDICTION ANALYSIS
Throughout this article, I will refer to the visual image of a house,
offered as a metaphor for personal jurisdiction analysis. The house is not an
elaborate mansion, but a small frame structure built on a subterranean stone
foundation. It is a stable, functional, traditional house, common to many
American neighborhoods in the middle part of the Twentieth Century. And,
as with any structure, the house began with a foundation.
Personal jurisdiction analysis is the offspring of procedural due process
and really came into being in American Jurisprudence after the application
of the Fifth Amendment to the states through the adoption and ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment.4 In fact, the foundation for modern personal
jurisdiction analysis was laid before the Fourteenth Amendment applied the
due process clause to the states.5

In the latter part of the Nineteenth

Century, the courts began to adjust to the birth of a mobile American
society.6 Prior to the era of industrialization and the meshing of crosscountry connections through a transcontinental railroad, American dispute
resolution was local.7

The Anglo-based procedures and customs were

4
The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed June 13, 1866 and ratified on July 28,
1868. The history of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment is described in
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
5
See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714.
6
See Philip L. Merkel, The Origins of an Expanded Federal Court Jurisdiction:
Railroad Development and the Ascendancy of the Federal Judiciary, THE BUSINESS
HISTORY REVIEW, Vol. 58, No., 3 (Autumn, 1984), 336-358.
7
See Michael Les Benedict, Preserving Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite
Court, THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW, Vol. 1978 (1978) 39-79.
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nurtured in American courts and much civil dispute still relied on face-toface resolution before a judge.8 Not until the nation stretched from east to
west did the courts face the challenge of determining proper procedural due
process when one party did not reside within the forum state.
Pennoyer was the first United States Supreme Court response to the
challenge of a more mobile society.9 In Pennoyer, the original landowner,
Neff, moved from Washington State to California, leaving behind a parcel
of land and a debt owed to his lawyer.10 Neff’s lawyer filed suit against
Neff for a $300 fee bill and sought a post-judgment seizure of Neff’s land in
order to satisfy the judgment.11 Neff’s land was sold to Neff’s lawyer for
$300 through a Sheriff’s sale without notice to Neff.12 The land was later
re-sold to Pennoyer.13 When Neff returned to Washington, he filed suit to
quiet title to his land, relying in part on a theory that he was deprived of

8

Id.
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714.
10
Id. at 717. Marcus Neff hired an attorney, John H. Mitchell, to help him with
paperwork for a land grant. Mitchell later sued Neff in the Oregon state court system for
unpaid bills; Neff was living in California and unaware of the proceedings. Mitchell won
the lawsuit by default judgment. When Mitchell won the lawsuit in February 1866, Neff's
land grant hadn't yet been conferred. Mitchell, possibly waiting for the arrival of the grant,
waited until July 1866 to get a writ of attachment on the property. The court later ordered
the land seized and sold in order to pay the judgment. Mitchell bought the land at that very
auction and later sold the land for approximately $15,000 and transferred the title to
Sylvester Pennoyer. In 1874, Neff sued Pennoyer in federal court to recover his land. The
trial court held in favor of Neff and Pennoyer appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
RICHARD D. FREER, INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL PROCEDURE 50 (2006).
11
Freer, supra note 10.
12
Id.
13
Id.
9
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procedural due process when the sale was made without notice to him.14
Although this case is most cited for its definitional distinctions
regarding in rem and in personam jurisdiction, a more interesting and less
explored attribute of the case is its illustration of the changing tensions in
American life. Neff left the state, thus leaving his property.15 When his
creditor filed suit on a debt owed, the very practical question of notice and
jurisdiction necessarily arose.16

Although Pennoyer post-dates the

intercontinental railroad and falls in the midst of the Industrial Revolution,
efficient means of communication were not developed in the far west of
Washington and California.17 In fact, the travel distance between Neff and
his property could not easily be negotiated and mail service as we know it
today was not an existing option.18 The creditor’s best option was to seek in
rem jurisdiction over Neff predicated on his real property, thus the Court
made a bold statement toward progress when it failed to uphold the original
judgment against Neff based on the plaintiff’s failure to identify Neff’s
property at the outset of the litigation.19 Of course, the error is more than

14

Id.
Id.
16
Id.
17
See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction,
THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW, Vol. 1965 (1965), 241-288.
18
See supra note 6.
19
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 721-722. “…every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and
sovereignty over persons and property within its territory.” Id. at 722. A state has power
over people and things inside its boundaries. Such power is demonstrated by the fact that
the courts of the state can seize people and property found within the state. Thus,
California has power over people and things inside California, and Oregon cannot exercise
15
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just one of timing and, as the Court asserts, the failure to identify the
property at the outset of the litigation deprives the defendant of prejudgment notice, thus failing to provide a basis for the court’s exercise of
jurisdiction over Neff, leading to an invalid judgment.20 However, and
perhaps more boldly, the Court in Pennoyer laid the foundation for a
territorial idea of personal jurisdiction.
The Court’s decision reflects the Post-Civil War climate of Pennoyer
and the new American tension around the idea of individual states and
territoriality.21 Before Pennoyer, territoriality ruled the civil process.22 In
Pennoyer, the court wrestles with that tension and ultimately incorporates
the traditions of territoriality into a modern era of Fourteenth Amendment
due process.23Pennoyer mediated the tension when upholding the value of
territoriality by affirming quasi in rem jurisdiction as a proper jurisdictional
predicate for a valid judgment while requiring the plaintiff to notify the
defendant that the land will serve as the jurisdictional basis of the suit at the
outset of the litigation.24

authority over such people or things. See also Freer, supra note 10 at 55.
20
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 722.
21
See supra note 7.
22
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 723(quoting Penn v. Lord Baltimore, 1 Ves. 444; Massie v.
Watts, 6 Cranch, 148; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet. Corbett v. Nutt, 10 Wall. 464).
23
See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 721-722. See also Freer, supra note 10 at 55, supra note 4.
24
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 725-726. “…if there is no appearance of the defendant, and no
service of process on him, the case becomes in its essential nature a proceeding in rem, the
only effect of which is to subject the property attached to the payment of the demand which
the court may find to be due to the plaintiff. That such is the nature of this proceeding…”
Id.
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The Court’s value of territoriality forms the foundation of modern
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.

Despite the emerging tensions of

growth, the Court required some contact with the territory as a basis for
personal jurisdiction.25 Thus, after Pennoyer, the stone foundation of the
metaphorical house of personal jurisdiction was complete. Despite growing
mobility, the defendant’s “place” would be a factor in determining the
court’s power over that person.
The structure of the metaphorical house of personal jurisdiction was
built in the middle of the Twentieth Century, framed with the new test of
“minimum contacts.”26

In 1942, the Supreme Court analyzed personal

jurisdiction involving that most mobile of the new Americans: the traveling
salesman.

In International Shoe v. Washington, the Court evaluated the

power courts in the State of Washington had over a company who reached
the forum state only through its sales people.27 The International Shoe

25

Id. at 721-722.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See 4 Fed. Prac. &
Proc. Civ.3d § 1067. “…International Shoe became a watershed case that redefined the
constitutional limitations on state court jurisdiction and, indirectly, the principles of
personal jurisdiction, almost completely.”
27
Id. at 310. The plaintiff, responsible for filing this suit in the State of Washington,
established a tax on employers doing business therein. The "tax" was a mandatory
contribution to the state's Unemployment Compensation Fund. The defendant, International
Shoe, was a company that was incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of
business in Missouri. The corporation had maintained for some time a staff of 11-13
salesmen in Washington who were residents of that state, and who occasionally rented
space to put up displays, as well as met with prospective customers in motels and hotels,
thus having no permanent "situs" of business in the State. International Shoe did not pay
the tax, so the state effected service of process on one of their salesmen with a notice of
assessment. Washington also sent a letter by registered mail to their place of business in
Missouri. International Shoe made a special appearance at the trial court to dispute the
26
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Company manufactured shoes in St. Louis, Missouri.28

9
It employed

salesmen who resided in the state of Washington.29 International Shoe did
not own any land in the state of Washington, but occasionally rented rooms
for the purpose of displaying shoes.30 Salesmen had no authority to accept
purchase offers; rather, they forwarded the offers to buy shoes to St. Louis,
where all decisions were made.31 Although the defendant company sold
shoes in Washington, the defendant, through its salesperson, had no real
presence in the forum state.32 The State argued, however, that the defendant
should be subject to personal jurisdiction within the forum state because it
sells its product in the state and thus enjoys the benefits and protections of
Washington state law.33 The Court responded to this basic question of
presence and personal jurisdiction by creating the “minimum contacts” test,
state's jurisdiction over it as a corporate "person." Personal jurisdiction was upheld in the
trial court and the Supreme Court of Washington, so International Shoe Co. appealed to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Freer, supra note 10, at 69. The International Shoe Company paid its salesmen on
commission. Additionally, it permitted salesmen to show only one shoe of a pair; the
argument was that by failing to ship an entire pair, the company was not really doing
business in Washington. Id.
31
Id. The International Shoe Company argued that by structuring the business in this
manner, the company was not subject to jurisdiction in Washington. Additionally, the
shoes were shipped “f.o.b.” from St. Louis. This means “free on board,” which requires
the purchaser to pay the freight charges to get the shoes from St. Louis. Thus, International
Shoe argued it did not ship anything into Washington and again reasoned that it should not
be subject to jurisdiction there.
32
Id. at 314. See also supra notes 27, 30, and 31.
33
Id. at 320. “… the activities carried on in behalf of appellant in the State of
Washington were neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic and continuous
throughout the years in question. They resulted in a large volume of interstate business, in
the course of which appellant received the benefits and protection of the laws of the state,
including the right to resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights. The obligation
which is here sued upon arose out of those very activities.”
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thus creating the modern standard for personal jurisdiction analysis.34 The
test, in its infancy, instructed that if a defendant had “minimum contacts”
with the forum state such that he availed himself of the benefits and
protections of the forum state’s laws, he would be subject to personal
jurisdiction in the forum state.35
The “minimum contacts” test forms the basic structure of the
metaphorical house of personal jurisdiction.

Through the years, the

structure has been refined and up-fitted with more detailed interpretations of
the test, including the development of sub-tests for purposeful availment
through

contracting

and

placing

products

into

the

stream

of

commerce.36However, throughout these refinements and the many to
follow, the Court has relied on the same basic concept held dear in
Pennoyer: territoriality.37The very essence of the minimum contacts test is
an evaluation of the defendant’s physical contacts within the forum state.
The analysis typically turns on the quality and nature of these contacts
demonstrated through sale revenues from products sold in the state, points
of destination for products shipped into the state, faxes, electronic mail and

34
Id. at 310. For cases demonstrating the living nature of the test see Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
35
International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
36
See e.g. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger
King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.
770 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
37
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 721-722; see also supra note 19.
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telephone calls placed to individuals within the forum state, and other factbased mechanisms for assessing the defendant’s contact with the forum.38
Although modern life has afforded more opportunities for individuals to
contact the forum state without being physically present in the state, the test
still relies on the very physical notion of contact. Thus, minimum contacts
analysis is rooted in place, just as the Court’s analysis was in Pennoyer, and
the metaphorical house of personal jurisdiction is framed upon a
longstanding theory of territoriality, a place theory of personal jurisdiction.
B. TENSIONS CREATED BY INTERNET-BASED CONTACTS
The importance of place has been challenged by an increasing digital
world. The house of personal jurisdiction began to feel crowded in the
1990s when national businesses began to use the Internet as a base for
commerce.39 New methods of digital business increased the accessibility of
information and materials and expanded our ability to interact nationally
and internationally.40

With the frame structure of minimum contacts

bursting at the seams, courts began to plan and ultimately build an addition
onto the metaphorical house to accommodate digital commerce.
Unfortunately, the addition was built without adequate consideration of the
38

See e.g. Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Silver Ring Splint
co. v. Digisplint, Inc., 508 F.Supp.2d 508 (W.D.Va., 2007); Taltwell, LLC v. Zonet USA
Corp., Slip Copy, 2007 WL 4562874, (E.D.Va, 2007); Sostre v. Leslie, Slip Copy, 2008
WL 245837 (D.R.I., Jan 04, 2008).
39
See generally Janet Abbate, Government, Business, and the Making of the Internet,
THE BUSINESS HISTORY REVIEW, Vol. 75, No. 1 (Spring, 2001) 147-176.
40
Id.

12
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underlying structure and the integrity of the framing, leaving an awkward
add-on to the frame structure that fails to add function and threatens the
foundational integrity of the entire house.
The renovation planning began in 1996 when federal courts addressed
the role of the Internet in three trademark infringement cases.41

In

Bensusan v. Kingd/b/a The Blue Note, a New York restaurateur brought a
trademark infringement suit against the operator of an Internet web site
which shared the restaurant’s famous name.42

The court granted the

defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction noting that
the web site operator did not make any effort to use the Internet to reach out
to New York, the forum state.43 Rather, the site derived revenue from
substantially local sources, rather than sources in New York or national
sources.44In addition to offering now quaint explanations of such new

41
Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v, King, 937 F.Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); CompuServe
Inc v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.Supp.
1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
42
Bensusan, 937 F.Supp. at 297 (1996). The Plaintiff’s New York club and the
Defendant’s Internet site both had the name “The Blue Note”. The defendant’s site
advertises a nightclub in Columbia, Missouri that serves Columbia residents almost
exclusively, mostly Univ. of Missouri students. The Missouri club created a site on the
Internet advertising the club in Missouri, which gave information about the club, an events
calendar, and ticketing information. The ticketing information included the names and
contact information of ticket outlets in Columbia, Missouri and a charge-by-phone
telephone number through which tickets could be ordered and picked up at the club.
43
The Court, in distinguishing this case from the almost simultaneous decision from
the Sixth Circuit in CompuServe, found that the facts of this case did not demonstrate the
defendant “reached out” from Missouri to New York. The Court held “[t]his action …
contains no allegations that King in any way directed any contact to, or had any contact
with, New York or intended to avail itself of any of New York’s benefits.” Id at 301.
44
The Court notes that no goods were shipped from Missouri to New York and the
defendant did not earn any revenues from New York residents. Id. at 299.

25-Sep-08
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concepts as “site”45 and “Internet”46, the court in Bensusan importantly
identifies that Internet activity can have a passive or active character,
determined by the site operator’s ability to foresee the site would be
accessed by users in other geographical regions.47
Also in 1996, the federal appeals court for the Sixth Circuit addressed
the question of minimum contacts through the Internet in CompuServe v.
Patterson.48 In CompuServe, the plaintiff CompuServe filed a declaratory
judgment action in the federal district court in Ohio against the defendant, a
CompuServe subscriber, to settle defendant’s allegations that CompuServe
had infringed on defendant’s software trademarks.49

The District Court

dismissed the action, finding that the defendant had not purposefully availed

45
“A ‘site’ is an Internet address which permits users to exchange digital information
with a particular host … and the World Wide Web refers to the collection of sites available
on the Internet. Id. at 297.
46
“The Internet is the world’s largest computer network (a network consisting of two
or more computers linked together to share electronic mail or files). The Internet is
actually a network of thousands of independent networks, containing several million ‘host’
computers that provide information services. An estimated 25 million individuals have
some form of Internet access, and this audience is doubling each year. …” Id.
47
The Court uses the existing tenet of foreseeability to delineate between the passive
and active nature of Internet sites; “… mere foreseeability of an in-state consequence and a
failure to avert that consequence is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.” Id. at
300.
48
CompuServe Inc v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
49
Id. CompuServe addressed the business relationship between defendant Patterson, a
Texas domiciliary, and plaintiff CompuServe, an Ohio corporation that provided
subscribers access to more than 1700 information services on the Internet. The defendant
entered into an agreement with the plaintiff for plaintiff to market and sell defendant’s
electronic programs, referred to as “shareware”, to other subscribers. The defendant
claimed plaintiff had stolen the design of his shareware products and marketed them under
the CompuServe name. When the parties could not resolve the dispute, the plaintiff filed a
declaratory judgment action. The defendant then moved the court to dismiss the case for
lack of personal jurisdiction in Ohio. The district court dismissed the case and the plaintiff
appealed.

14
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himself of the benefits and privileges of Ohio law.50 The plaintiff appealed,
arguing, among other points, that the defendant had purposefully availed
himself of Ohio law through the process of entering into a contract with the
plaintiff for the sale and marketing of “shareware” to CompuServe
subscribers.

The Sixth Circuit agreed with CompuServe, noting that

Patterson knowingly made an effort and purposefully contracted to market
his product nationally, with CompuServe’s Ohio operations serving as his
distribution center.51 The Sixth Circuit considered the case to present a
“novel question of first impression” regarding the sufficiency of electronic
contacts under the Due Process Clause analysis of personal jurisdiction.52
However, the Court reasoned the case through the lens of a contract-based
jurisdiction inquiry.53 Despite grand allusions to the Internet as “the latest

50
Id. at 1260-61. The district court held that the electronic links between the
defendant Patterson, who is a Texan, and Ohio, where CompuServe is headquartered, were
“too tenuous to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction.” The district court also denied
CompuServe's motion for reconsideration.
51
Id. at 1263.
52
Id. at 1262. The Court stated the issue as “[d]id CompuServe make a prima facie
showing that Patterson’s contacts with Ohio, which have been almost entirely electronic in
nature, are sufficient, under the Due Process Clause, to support the district court’s exercise
of personal jurisdiction over him?”
53
The CompuServe Court asserted that a defendant does not have to be physically
present in the forum state to satisfy the requirements of purposefully availment. The Court
cited Burger King; “‘So long as a commercial actor's efforts are ‘purposefully directed’
toward residents of another State, we have consistently rejected the notion that an absence
of physical contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at
476.’” Id. at 1263. Further, the CompuServe Court reasoned, “the defendant consciously
reached out from Texas to Ohio to subscribe to CompuServe, and to use its service to
market his computer software on the Internet. He entered into a contract which expressly
stated that it would be governed by and construed in light of Ohio law. Ohio has written
and interpreted its long-arm statute, and particularly its “transacting business” subsection,
with the intent of reaching as far as the Due Process Clause will allow, and it certainly has
an interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents. As the Burger King

25-Sep-08
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and greatest manifestation of [these] historical, globe-shrinking trends”54,
the Court again relied on the imbedded concept of forseeability to find the
defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction in Ohio.55 Thus, despite the
defendant’s lack of any other contact with the forum state, the act of
reaching out into Ohio electronically satisfied the Due Process
requirements.56
The third case57 in the trilogy of trademark infringement cases which led
to the addition on the house of personal jurisdiction also found the
defendant subject to the forum state’s jurisdiction through the lens of
traditional minimum contacts analysis.58 However, as in Bensusan59 and
CompuServe,60 the District Court in Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc. bolstered the
importance of the case around the newness of the Internet, again identifying

Corp. Court noted, the purposeful direction of one's activities toward a state has always
been significant in personal jurisdiction cases, particularly where individuals purposefully
derive benefits from interstate activities. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472-73.” Id. at
1266.
54
Id. at 1262. “The Internet represents perhaps the latest and greatest manifestation of
these historical, globe-shrinking trends. It enables anyone with the right equipment and
knowledge-that is, people like Patterson-to operate an international business cheaply, and
from a desktop. That business operator, however, remains entitled to the protection of the
Due Process Clause, which mandates that potential defendants be able ‘to structure their
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where the conduct will and will not
render them liable to suit.’ World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567.
Thus, this case presents a situation where we must reconsider the scope of our
jurisdictional reach.”
55
Id. at 1265. (“Patterson deliberately set in motion an ongoing marketing relationship
with CompuServe, and he should have reasonably foreseen that doing so would have
consequences in Ohio.”)
56
See id. at 1266.
57
Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp 1328 (E.D. Mo 1996).
58
Id.
59
See supra text accompanying note 41.
60
See supra text accompanying note 50.

16
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the personal jurisdiction question as an issue of first impression.61 The
Court labeled the Internet as an entirely new means of information
exchange and found that analogies to cases involving mail and telephone
contacts inapposite based on the ability of electronic mail to efficiently
reach a global audience.62 The subtext of the District Court’s opinion is a
reticence to accept the advent of electronic communication and an unspoken
fear of this new medium of commercial communication.63 Despite this
reticence, the Court sets out and follows the Eighth Circuit’s five-prong test
for measuring minimum contacts, focusing the analysis on the nature and
quality of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.64
Two points of influence flow from the District Court’s decision in

61
Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1332. The Court frames the issue as follows: “Whether
maintaining a website, such as the one maintained by Cybergold, which can be accessed by
any internet user, and which appears to be maintained for the purpose of, and in
anticipation of, being accessed and used by any and all internet users, including those
residing in Missouri, amounts to promotional activities or active solicitations such as to
provide the minimum contacts necessary for exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation, presents an issue of first impression to this Court.” In similar
language to that used in Bensusan and CompuServe, the Maritz Court highlights the new
and mysterious character of the Internet and electronic communication and suggests the
Internet raises new questions of due process.
62
Id. at 1332. The Court notes that electronic mail differs from posted mail in its
efficiency and reach and different from an 800 number telephone contact scheme because
the use of an Internet site puts the operator in immediate contact with interested persons,
whereas the use of an 800 number requires the operator to advertise the number, then
having interested persons call in to the operator). See also Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction
Set, 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
63
Id. at 1330; The Court defines the terms “Internet” and “information superhighway”,
describing CyberGold’s web service as an example of the Internet’s ability to interconnect
computers to each other.
64
Id. at 1332. The Eighth Circuits five part test includes: (1) the nature and quality of
the contacts with the forum state; (2) the quality of the contacts; (3) the relationship
between the contacts and the cause of action; (4) the interest of the forum state; (5) the
convenience of the parties.
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Maritz. First, the Court concludes that the nature and quality of contacts
provided by the maintenance of a website on the Internet are of a different
nature and quality than other means of contact with the forum state.65 This
conclusion flows from the Court’s limited understanding of electronic mail
and Internet use, rather than from the actual facts of this case and the
actions of the defendant. The Court finds the website’s ability to respond to
each and every person who accesses the site evidence of Cybergold’s intent
to reach out to all Internet users everywhere, thus establishing purposeful
availment and sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction.66 Secondly, the
Court’s opinion introduces the concept of a passive web site but reasons this
distinction irrelevant as any website on the Internet demonstrates an intent
to reach all Internet users.67
C. THE DISTRICT COURT’S REMEDY IN ZIPPO
The infant jurisprudence birthed in 1996 cried out for more space. The
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania responded in
January 1997 when it renovated the house of personal jurisdiction with the
65

Id. at 1333.
Id. at 1333.
67
Id. at 1333. Cybergold introduced the concept of passive web sites by characterizing
its website as passive. The Court disagreed with Cybergold’s reasoning: “CyberGold's
posting of information about its new, up-coming service through a website seeks to develop
a mailing list of internet users, as such users are essential to the success of its service.
Clearly, CyberGold has obtained the website for the purpose of, and in anticipation that,
Internet users, searching the Internet for websites, will access CyberGold's website and
eventually sign up on CyberGold's mailing list. Although CyberGold characterizes its
activity as merely maintaining a “passive website,” its intent is to reach all internet users,
regardless of geographic location.”
66
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addition of a new sliding scale to be used in evaluating minimum contacts
based on Internet activity.68
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.arose from a trademark
infringement action, brought under the Lanham Act69, by a frequent
enforcer

of

its

trademarks,

Zippo

Manufacturing

Company,

Pennsylvania manufacturer of “Zippo” tobacco lighters.70

the

Zippo

Manufacturing complained that Zippo Dot Com, a California-based Internet
news service, infringed on the Zippo trademark by use of domain names,
including the name “Zippo.”71 Zippo Dot Com moved to dismiss for lack
of personal jurisdiction arguing it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in
Pennsylvania.72 Zippo Manufacturing argued that Zippo Dot Com’s web
site was accessible to Pennsylvania residents and Pennsylvania residents
were subscribers to the news service through the Internet site73, thus Zippo

68

Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.

1997).
69

See id. at 1121; see also the Federal Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127.
Id. See e.g. Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F.Supp. 670
(S.D.N.Y. 1963).
71
Id. at 1121-22. (Zippo Dot Com obtained the exclusive right to use the domain
names “zippo.com”, “zippo.net”, and “zipponews.com”. Zippo Dot Com operated a web
site which contained information about the company, advertisements and an application to
become a subscriber to the news service. Through the use of the word “Zippo” in the
domain name, activity on the site generates the use of the word “Zippo” in numerous
locations on the company’s web site and in many downloads and messages sent from and
posted on the web site.)
72
Id. at 1121.
73
Id. All of Zippo Dot Com’s contacts with Pennsylvania occurred over the Internet.
The web site was accessible nationally. Zippo Dot Com had approximately 140,000
subscribers worldwide, and approximately 2% of the subscribers, 3000, were Pennsylvania
residents. In addition, Zippo Dot Com had entered into seven agreements with Internet
Service Providers in Pennsylvania.
70
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Dot Com had sufficient minimum contacts with Pennsylvania to allow for
the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Zippo Dot Com.74
The Zippo Court’s analysis again begins at the “Constitutional
touchstone” of minimum contacts, recognizing the role of forseeability and
“reaching out” in the determination of purposeful availment.75

Then,

relying specifically on the 1996 trilogy of trademark infringement cases76,
the Court devises a sliding scale to be applied to evaluate the nature and
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet77.

74
Id. at 1122. The Court holds that Zippo Dot Com would not be subject to general
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, thus narrowing their inquiry to whether the defendant has
sufficient minimum contacts with the forum, whether the claim asserted arises out of the
defendant’s contacts, and whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant
is reasonable.
75
Id. at 1123.
76
See supra note 30. See also Panavision Intern., L.P. v. Toeppen, 938 F. Supp. 616
(C.D. Cal. 1996); Inset Systems, Inc. Instruction Set, 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
77
See id. at 1123-24. The Court textually explains a sliding scale used to differentiate
between activity on web sites. The graphic used below is a visual interpretation of the
Court’s textual description of the scale.
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The sliding scale demonstrates the spectrum of a defendant’s business
activity on the Internet.78 On one end of the scale, the Court describes
situations where businesses clearly conduct business on the Internet through
contracting with foreign residents and the repeated and knowing
transmission of computer files through the Internet.79The Court opines that
defendants with activity falling at this end of the scale are subject to
personal jurisdiction. At the opposite end of the scale, the Court describes
passive web sites which provide information only to Internet users and are

78
79

Id.
Id. Citing Compuserve Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F. Supp. 1257 (6th Cir. 1996).
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not sufficient to subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction.80 The Court
then describes the “middle ground” of Internet activity, a space occupied by
interactive sites wherein the user and host computer can exchange
information, which requires the court to examine the nature of activity on
the individual site to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction
is proper.81
The sliding scale confirms the outcome of minimum contacts analysis
on Internet-based activity that is either predominantly passive or
overwhelmingly active and interactive.

As in prior cases of mail or

telephone communication between remote parties, the level and nature of
the activity controls the jurisdictional analysis.82 If a defendant uses the
Internet to attract foreign customers and contacts then continues to deal with
the out-of-state entity through the Internet or otherwise, the traditional basis
for personal jurisdiction is formed. Likewise, if the defendant does nothing
more than make information available to the general public, through the
Internet or through traditional advertising, the test for personal jurisdiction
is likely not met as the activity does not demonstrate purposeful availment.
The passive and active ends of the Zippo sliding scale contribute nothing to
the established understanding of minimum contacts and purposeful
availment. It is the vast mid-section of the scale, the interactive web sites,
80

Id. Citing Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Id. Citing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
82
See supra note 62.
81
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that present the difficult questions.
D. THE ISSUE OF POST-ZIPPO DESTABILIZATION
The Zippo Court reasoned its scale was a new approach to personal
jurisdiction analysis developed to intercept the “global revolution looming
on the horizon”, thus staging its own opinion as the next step in a
progression of personal jurisdiction law83. However, the Zippo Court’s
creation and application of the scale fails to offer any new approach to
personal jurisdiction analysis. In fact, the scale itself has led to more
confusion as courts have tried to comprehensively wedge Internet-based
contacts questions into the inadequate and poorly structured scale,
essentially over-building and over-crowding the addition to the house of
personal jurisdiction.

1. The Structural Stress ofZippo’s Progeny
The renovated house of personal jurisdiction has become an attractive
gathering place for courts and litigants wrestling with motions to dismiss
predicated on Internet-based contacts.84 Specifically, crowds have gathered

83
Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1123(quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958)(“As
technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for
jurisdiction has undergone a similar increase.”.). The Zippo Court also quotes Burger King
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) for the principle that physical presence in the forum is
not required for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
84
See e.g. ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002);
Mink v. AAAA Development LLC, 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); Roberts v. Paulin, 2007
WL 3203969 (E.D.Mich., Oct 31, 2007)(NO. 07-CV-13207); Premedics v. Zoll, 2007 WL
3012968 (M.D.Tenn., Oct 09, 2007)(NO.3:06-0716).
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in the new addition, and even more specifically, within the particular space
on the scale, the middle section, ascribed to an interactive, commercial web
presence.85 Despite the fact that the Zippo sliding scale is the creation of a
federal district court, many courts began to import the test into decisions
invoking a website as a predicate for personal jurisdiction.86 Discussion of
Deleted: has

the scale emerged in all of the circuits at the time of the scale’s creation in
1999. Reference to the scale has continued through the present,however,
some circuits have been reluctant to affirmatively adopt the scale.87 Other
circuits have been less reticent.88

85

See supra chart page 21.
See e.g. Roberts v. Paulin, 2007 WL 3203969 (E.D.Mich., Oct 31, 2007)(NO. 07CV-13207 (The court evaluates the question of personal jurisdiction regarding a California
Company that advertises its product through a website which is accessible to Michigan
residents but does not allow for purchases online).
87
See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir. 1997); Panavision Int’l,
L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring “something more” than a passive
website with advertising and contact information to indicate defendant purposefully
directed activity at forum state; “something more” may be established if the plaintiff can
establish the effects test); Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2002); Noegen Corp. v.
Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2002) (The presence of a website that is
“interactive to a degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with residents of the
state” is sufficient to show purposeful availment); Toys R Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318
F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2003) (requiring the defendant had knowledge demonstrated by “directly
targeting its web site to the state, knowingly interacting with residents of the forum state
via its web site, or through sufficient other related contacts.”); Ginsburg v. Dinicola, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41418 (D. Mass. June 7, 2007) (ten decisions from this circuit cite the
Zippo scale but the Circuit has neither elaborated or adopted the scale); Abbot Labs v.
Mylan Pharms, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13782 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2006) (district court
decisions from the 7th circuit have not adopted the Zippo scale; however the district courts
weigh the presence of the website into the analysis, placing significant emphasis on how
much control the defendant has in designing, maintaining, and updating the website); Baker
v. Carnival Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85114 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2006) (district courts
in the 11th Circuit have focused on evaluating continuous and systematic contacts perhaps
sustained through Internet activity); GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 21
F.Supp. 2d 27 (1998) (seven cases from the D.C. Cir. have cited Zippo but only one
District court case has textually adopted the scale).
88
See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002) (4th
86
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The 4th Circuit recognized the Internet-based contacts question invoked
an existing controversy between the traditional minimum contacts analysis
and the effects test developed through Calder v. Jones89 and applied in
cases of intentional tort actions.90 When the plaintiff alleges an intentional
tort via use of a website, the two tests coalesce around the nexus of the
Internet activity. In ALS Scan, the plaintiffs alleged a Georgia-based
Internet Service Provider subjected itself to personal jurisdiction in
Maryland by enabling a website owner to publish photographs on the
Internet, staging arguments from the traditional contacts perspective and the
effects test perspective.91 Given that the contact arguments were centered
on Internet activity, the Circuit Court invoked the Zippo sliding scale,
stating its adoption of the scale while creating a new test which essentially
imports the Zippo scale into a Calder-like effects test.92 The Fourth Circuit
test adopting the Zippo scale provides a court can exercise personal

Circuit adopts the Zippo scale but creates a test for personal jurisdiction that combines the
Zippo scale and the test used in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). Thus, a court may
find personal jurisdiction when: (1) the defendant directs electronic activity into the state,
(2) with the manifested intent of engaging in business or other interactions within the state,
and (3) that activity creates a potential cause of action in the state); Lakin v. Prudential
Securities, Inc., 348 F.3d 704 (8th Cir. 2003) (the Zippo scale is properly used in cases
where specific jurisdiction is alleged but the Zippo scale alone is not sufficient when
general jurisdiction is alleged to exist); Soma Med. Int’l v. Std. Chtd. Bank, 196 F.3d 1292
(10th Cir. 1999); Mink v. AAAA Development LLC, 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999); Best
Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker, 490 F.3d 239 (2nd Cir. 2007) (using Zippo scale not as a separate
analytical framework but as a tool to decide whether a defendant has transacted business in
the forum).
89
Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 at 787 (1984).
90
See ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002).
91
Id. at 707.
92
See id. at 714.
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jurisdiction over a person outside of the forum when that person (1) directs
electronic activity into the state, (2) with the manifested intent of engaging
in business or other interactions within the forum, and (3) that activity
creates, in a person within the forum, a potential cause of action cognizable
within under the laws of the forum.93 The test devised by the Fourth Circuit
substitutes an intent analysis for the Zippo scale’s determination of website
interactivity.94 As applied, the test places websites used to intentionally
direct electronic commercial activity into the forum into the interactive arm
of the scale.95 However, the Fourth Circuit’s professed adoption of the
Zippo scale arguably adds no dimension to the already one-dimensional

93

Id. at 714. (“Thus, adopting and adapting the Zippo model, we conclude that a State
may, consistent with due process, exercise judicial power over a person outside of the State
when that person (1) directs electronic activity into the State, (2) with the manifested intent
of engaging in business or other interactions within the State, and (3) that activity creates,
in a person within the State, a potential cause of action cognizable in the State's courts.
Under this standard, a person who simply places information on the Internet does not
subject himself to jurisdiction in each State into which the electronic signal is transmitted
and received. Such passive Internet activity does not generally include directing electronic
activity into the State with the manifested intent of engaging business or other interactions
in the State thus creating in a person within the State a potential cause of action cognizable
in courts located in the State); see also Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 at 787 (1984) (Under
Calder, personal jurisdiction can be based upon: (1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed
at the forum state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered-and which the defendant
knows is likely to be suffered-in the forum state.)
94
Id.
95
See id. at 714; see also Motley Rice, LLC v. Baldwin v. Baldwin, LLP, 518 F. Supp.
2d 688 (D.S.C. 2007). A South Carolina law firm sued a Texas law alleging breach of cocounsel and fee sharing agreements and seeking to clarify, reform, or rescind such
agreements. Following the removal of case on diversity grounds, the Texas law firm
moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the alternative, to transfer case to
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The Motley Rice court noted,
“ALS Scan provides some support to Plaintiffs' argument that the court has personal
jurisdiction over Defendant. Plaintiffs and Defendant communicated with each other during
their nineteen year relationship in which they served as co-counsel, and Plaintiffs now have
a potential cause of action against Defendant for breach of contract.” Id. at 695.
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nature of the middle portion of the scale since activity and intent measure
the same element of the defendant’s conduct, measuring the defendant’s
acts to purposefully engage persons in the forum.
The Fifth Circuit also crowded into the new room in the house of
personal jurisdiction by crafting the Zippo sliding scale into a test relying on
commercial traffic.96 In Mink, the defendant company did not take purchase
orders through their website, thus no interactive commercial activity could
be conducted through the site.97 The website at issue was essentially a
bulletin board that merely posted information about the defendant’s
products.98 By employing the scale to resolve the personal jurisdiction
question, the Fifth Circuit created its own version of Zippo which provided
that if the website in question allows visitors to purchase products and
services online, the Court will exercise personal jurisdiction over the

96

See Mink v. AAAA Development LLC, 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999) (“We find the
reasoning of Zippo is persuasive and adopt it in this Circuit.”)
97
Id. Mink was a Texas resident and furniture salesman. In January 1997, Mink
claimed that he began to develop a computer program designed to track information on
sales made and opportunities missed on sales not made. On May 13, 1997, Mink applied
for a patent. Mink claimed that in June 1997 he was approached by a Colorado resident,
Stark, whom he eventually shared information with regarding his computer program.
Between June 1997 and October 1997, Stark allegedly shared all of Mink's ideas and
information about the program with Middlebrook. According to Mink's complaint,
Middlebrook and two companies, AAAA Development and Profitsystems, conspired to
copy Mink's copyrighted and patent-pending program and create an identical system of
their own for financial gain. AAAA Development is a Vermont corporation with its
principal place of business in Vermont. Middlebrook is a Vermont resident. Neither AAAA
Development nor Middlebrook own property in Texas. The company had advertised in a
national furniture trade journal and maintained a website advertising its sales management
software on the Internet.
98
Id. at 336.
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defendant.99 However, the analysis employed by the Circuit Court did not
require the use of the scale. A simple factual analysis of purposeful
availment would have rendered the same result.100
Implementation of the Zippo sliding scale has led to a confusing array of
decisions which demonstrate the gimmickry of the scale. In cases where the
issue of personal jurisdiction centers on product sales between states, the
court has invoked Zippo when the company had a website which either
advertised or sold products, despite other evidence of contact between the
defendant and the forum state.101 In the product cases, the court relies on
the traditional device of the amount of revenue from product sales, despite
the invocation of Zippo by the litigants or the court, to determine the issue

99
Id. “ … AAAA’s website does not allow consumers to order or purchase products
and services online.” See also Roberts v. Paulin, 2007 WL 3203969 (E.D. Mich., Oct. 31,
2007) (No. 07-CV-13207) (evaluating defendant’s presence in the forum, the court notes
the defendant has sold less than $500 worth of products in the forum); Tamboro v.
Dworkin, 2007 WL 3046216 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 9, 2007) (No. 04 C 3317) (holding that a
website which allows visitors to access information about canine pedigrees is not
interactive because it does not allow communication regarding products and services).
100
See id. See also Bensusan Restaurant Corp v. King, 937 F. Supp 295 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) and supra notes 41-47.
101
See e.g. George Kessel Intern. Inc. v. Classic Wholesales, Inc., 2007 WL 3208297
(D. Ariz., Oct 30, 2007)(NO.CV-07-323-PHXSMM) (holding the defendant’s website was
“passive”, lacking the “additional conduct” which would place it on the interactive end of
the scale; however, the court ignores other communications between the parties which
potentially establish purposeful availment); Roberts v. Paulin, 2007 WL 3203969
(E.D.Mich., Oct 31, 2007)(NO. 07-CV-13207) (court employs the Zippo scale and rests
interactivity decision on amount of commercial revenues from the forum despite the
evidence showing the California defendant had no commercial contact with the forum
state); Premedics, Inc. v. Zoll Medical Corp., 2007 WL 3012968 (M.D.Tenn., Oct 09,
2007)(NO.3:06-0716); Beightler v. Produckte Fur Die Medizin, 2007 WL2713907 (N.D.
Ohio Sep. 17, 2007)(NO. 3:07C1604) (appellate court reversing district court decision that
defendant was not subject to personal jurisdiction because the defendant’s website fell to
the passive end of the scale when facts of the case demonstrated the defendant hacked into
the plaintiff’s website intending to pirate information and directly contacted the plaintiff).
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of presence in the forum.102 A product site that does not generate revenue
of a substantial amount is not deemed to be an interactive site when set
upon the sliding scale.103 The scale has also been argued and employed
when the defendant’s site is not commercial in nature.104 Courts and
litigants seem to overlook the basic logic of contacts analysis when
confronted with an Internet-based business or communication between the
parties through electronic mail.105 Despite the lack of any commercial
Internet activity, Zippo is applied in the analysis and the court finds the

102

See e.g. Roberts v. Paulin, 2007 WL 3203969 (E.D. Mich., Oct. 31, 2007) (No. 07CV-13207); Tamboro v. Dworkin, 2007 WL 3046216 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 9, 2007) (No. 04 C
3317).
103
See supra note 101.
104
See Vax-D Medical Technologies, LLC v. Allied Health Management, LTD., 2006
WL 4847740 (M.D.Fla., Mar 14, 2006)(NO. 804-CV-1617-T-26TGW)(the defendant’s
website is a referral site that directs users to chiropractors who employ the VAX-D
technique); Chicago Architecture Foundation v. Domain Magic, LLC, 2007 WL 3046124
(N.D.Ill., Oct 12, 2007)(NO. 07 C 764) (defendant created website portal specifically
designed to pirate plaintiff’s website hits in order to create advertising revenues; the court
cites to Zippo and places the defendant’s website on the Zippo scale despite the absence of
any commercial traffic between the plaintiff and defendant).
105
See Motley Rice, LLC v. Baldwin & Baldwin, LLP, 518 F.Supp.2d 688, D.S.C., Jul
30, 2007 (NO. C.A.2:07-01368-PMD)(two law firms litigated fee sharing contracts after 19
years of working together on class action litigation; the district court follows the 4th Circuit
in applying Zippo through test stated in ALS Scan to find that the defendant’s web
presence was not enough to establish “purposeful availment”); Dearwater v. Bond
Mfg.Co., 2007 WL 2745321 (D.Vt., Sep 19, 2007)(NO. 1:06-CV-154)(plaintiff brought a
wrongful termination lawsuit against defendant employer Bond Mfg. The plaintiff acquired
the job through e-mails in response to advertisements on Craigslist and CareerBuilder.com.
Defendant Bond has no connection to the forum state and the plaintiff’s only basis for
asserting personal jurisdiction was the defendant’s advertisements on national websites.
The plaintiff argued the Zippo scale should apply, using the job search sites (which are at
the most active end of the Zippo scale) as a basis to assert personal jurisdiction over the
defendant).
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website is passive, lacking the “something more” required to find
purposeful availment.106
2. The House Destabilized
The Zippo sliding scale has had the reverse effect on personal
jurisdiction jurisprudence. Rather than enhancing the house of personal
jurisdiction, the scale has directed courts and parties to a less stable area of
the house, a room not supported by the original place-based structure. The
house of personal jurisdiction has been destabilized by the Zippo
renovations.
The original posture for the scale followed the reasoning of courts
which relied on the newness of Internet activity.107 The Internet was
described in terms of its ephemeral existence online, with devices now as
commonplace as electronic mail described as different than posted mail and
telephone calls through an 800 number because electronic mail does not
place a person in actual contact with another person in the forum state.108
Thus, the predicate for the Zippo scale was based on the concept of noncontact rather than on the longstanding concepts of minimum contacts and
106

See Zombech v. Amada, 2007 WL 4105231 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2007)(NO.CIV.A.
06-953) (in a products liability case against a foreign component part manufacturer,
plaintiff converts a stream of commerce analysis into a Zippo analysis by alleging the
defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in the forum when the defendant has a website
that allows e-mail comment, despite no other evidence of contact with the forum state).
107
See supra note 61-63 and text accompanying notes 52,54 and 62. See also Bensusan
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold,
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996); Compuserve Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F. Supp. 1257
(6th Cir. 1996).
108
See supra note 62.
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purposeful availment. The early decisions identified the issue of Internetbased contacts as matters of first impression, distinct from the traditional
personal jurisdiction case.109 By so doing, courts have turned away from
traditional place-based analysis and attempted to create a new arm of
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence for Internet-based contacts.
This new analysis is, by definition, not based on the traditional tenets of
territoriality and contacts. Given the historical import of territory and
contact110, a new analysis for Internet-based contacts which attempts to
define itself separately finds itself inadequately supported. The new
approach’s lack of architectural support is demonstrated through the post
Zippo decisions themselves.111 A court may invoke the scale only as a
means to describe the Internet basis for the jurisdictional argument.112 The
decisions often then revert to a more traditional contacts analysis, relying on
the secure ground of revenues, contracts, and communication despite
sometimes lengthy discussions of the passivity or interactivity of the
website.113 In essence, when the courts invoke the scale, they find
themselves in a destabilized portion of the house of personal jurisdiction
and they move the case onto more stable ground.
109

See supra notes 61-63 and text accompanying notes 52,54 and 62.
See supra notes 19, 33.
111
See e.g. Premedics v. Zoll, 2007 WL 3012968 (M.D. Tenn., Oct. 9, 2007)(NO.3:060716)
112
See e.g. Words Music, LLC v. Priddis Music, Inc., 2007 WL 32321835 (M.D.
Tenn., Oct. 30 3007)(NO. 3:07CV0502)
113
See e.g. Chicago Architectural Foundation v. Domain Magic, LLC, 2007 WL
3046124 (N.D.Ill. Oct. 12, 2007)(NO. 07 C 764).
110
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III. UTILIZING THE PLACE THEORY FRAMEWORK IN
INTERNET-BASED CONTACTS ANALYSIS
Place theory is the theory of personal jurisdiction created through
the early law of Pennoyer and International Shoe.114 The core of place
theory is the understanding that for a defendant to be subject to personal
jurisdiction within the forum, the defendant must have some contact
with the territory of the forum.115 Although contacts have been
traditionally viewed as variations of physical contact, such as actual
physical presence through travel, sales or corporate operations, or
telephone, facsimile, or mail correspondence, the core value in a
contacts analysis is a “reaching out” from the defendant’s forum to the
plaintiff’s forum.116 Since jurisdictional analysis is largely a fact-based
analysis, tying contact analysis to place provides courts a framework
under which the defendant’s activity can be evaluated and weighed
against other factors in the overall jurisdictional analysis. When
electronic contacts through websites are considered untethered to a
physical place, courts are deprived of the framework for evaluating the
defendant’s purposeful availment.

114

See supra notes 19, 33.
See supra notes 19-24.
116
See supra note 38.
115
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A. ATTRIBUTES OF PLACE THEORY
The place theory of personal jurisdiction is marked by certain attributes
which combine the historical roots of territorial jurisdiction with the
appropriate flexibility necessary to the modern commercial context. First,
place theory is rooted in the traditional jurisprudence of personal
jurisdiction.117 Second, place theory, because it is rooted in contacts theory,
applies flexibly to almost all situations where personal jurisdiction is raised
in the context of commercial and non-commercial interactions. Third, place
theory is able to uniquely respond to the new realities of interaction
between remote parties through the Internet because it relies on an
established framework for jurisdictional analysis.
The first attribute of place theory is a basis in established
jurisprudence.118 The theory recognizes that the entire concept of in
personam jurisdiction has rested across centuries on the concept of
territorialism: the idea that a forum’s reach extends to its borders and the
forum has a duty to protect its citizens from harm.119 This core concept has
evolved into a test based on contacts with the forum120and the reach of the
forum has extended with the development of the contacts test.121 As courts
expanded contacts to include more remote interaction, courts shifted the
117

See supra notes 19-24.
.See id.
119
See supra notes 17, 19
120
See supra note 33.
121
See e.g.Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
118
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focus to whether the contacts demonstrate a defendant purposefully availed
itself of the benefits and protections of the forum.122 Thus the place theory
framework for personal jurisdiction analysis was created around the
coalescing concepts of presence, contacts, and purposeful availment.
Place theory framework provided the necessary flexibility to deal with
over fifty years of commercial progress in the Twentieth Century.123 The
issue of purposeful availment has been measured in the modern context of
remote communications, such as facsimile transmissions, telephone calls,
mail order business, and other devices of commercial communication that
allow parties to develop contacts without travel to the forum.124 When the
framework relies on purposeful contacts to assess jurisdiction, it is able to
flex around technology. If the framework were less flexible, it would have
required change with each Twentieth Century advancement, generating a
new line of analysis when fax communications replaced posted mail and
mail order sales replaced the traveling salesperson.
The Internet has brought what are arguably the most significant
communications changes of the late Twentieth and early Twenty-First
centuries. As fax replaced mail and mail order replaced traveling
salespersons, electronic mail now makes all other forms of communication
dated and Internet commerce now offers conveniences other sales
122
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See e.g. Burger King Corp v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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approaches cannot offer. However, the underlying act between the parties
in an electronic communication or an Internet sale is the same. In all
scenarios there is a reaching out from one party to the other through some
means of contact. The reaching out is the measure of purposeful availment.
If a defendant’s telephone contacts to the forum state can demonstrate
purposeful availment, so can his electronic mail. If a defendant company
purposefully avails itself of the forum through mailing a catalog and order
form, then a defendant company which uses the Internet for direct sales is
purposefully availing itself of the forums where it makes sales to customers
within the forum. The devices for sales and communications have become
more complicated but the behavioral analysis should remain with the same
framework. Whether the court finds itself analyzing telephone calls or
electronic mail transmissions, it should still be analyzing whether the
defendant’s pattern of commercial behavior suggests the defendant acted
purposefully to engage in commerce within the forum.
The fallacy of the Zippo scale is its attempt to recast the place theory
framework in the context of the Internet. The sliding scale has been
erroneously adopted as a new framework for analyzing situations where the
parties dealt through the Internet. At the most, the scale has defined a way
to measure purposeful availment through Internet sites by determining
whether the site in question is passive or interactive. An interactive site
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occupies the most purposeful end of the scale, creating what is in essence a
presumption that interactive web sites subject the site operators to personal
jurisdiction in any forum the site accesses. However, a place-based analysis
of Internet activity, without consideration of the sliding scale, would yield
the same result as the quantity and quality of the contacts would
demonstrate purposeful availment. Likewise, the passive end of the scale is
equally superfluous as passive web sites indicate low contact and little
effort to reach out to a forum. The issue using either the place theory
framework or the sliding scale is the determination of jurisdiction when the
commercial interaction falls some place in between passive and active. To
the extent the scale is used to identify cases which fall into this more
complex area, it can be helpful. However, the scale itself offers no
framework for resolving the jurisdictional questions generated by activity
falling in the middle of the scale.

B. PLACE THEORY EXEMPLIFIED IN THE MODERN CONTEXT
The absence of an analytical framework in the Zippo scale is
exemplified in cases which struggle to apply the scale. Consider the
following example of a case involving conduct through an Internet web site.
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MedicOne125 is a Tennessee corporation that markets and distributes
automated external defibrillators (AEDs). As part of its business,
MedicOne offers programs and support services to AED purchasers and
users through an Internet web site. MedicOne manages its online
support services through a patent-pending “three prong readiness” webbased interface system developed by MedicOne called the “AED
Manager.” The AED Manager checks the status of participating AEDs,
and sends automated “action item” emails to customers to have their
AED units tested for readiness. MedicOne operates a website that lists
general information about the company, including contact information
and a description of its services. The MedicOne website contains an
access point to the AED Manager, which users may access only after
entering in a correct login name and password.
In July 2002, MedicOne and CALL Medical Corporation (CALL), a
Massachusetts-based company that manufactures and markets AEDs,
entered into a contract whereby MedicOne agreed to provide certain
CALL customers with support services, including the AED Manager.
In 2004, CALL took steps to reverse engineer and copy the AED
Manager, ultimately creating and advertising its own web-based
interactive database application. According to MedicOne, CALL
engaged ProM Management to reproduce the MedicOne web-based
support system.
ProMaccessed MedicOne’s Internet website, and navigated onto the
AED Manager portion of the website. ProM created an unauthorized test
account for the AED Manager, an account that is only distributed to
MedicOne’s own web developers. As a result of establishing a test
account, CALL and ProM were able to receive the automated “action
item” emails from the MedicOne system, which is a proprietary
component of MedicOne’s system. MedicOne contends that by
improperly logging into the AED Manager using an unauthorized test
account, and receiving the automated emails, ProM and CALL were
able to determine the functionality of the AED Manager for the purpose
of reproducing it. On September 8, 2004, ProM’s website published a
statement that it had developed an interactive database application on
behalf of CALL, called “CALL MD.” CALL made a similar publication
125
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on its website in October 2004, advertising its CALL MD program.
MedicOne has brought a number of claims against ProM and CALL,
including claims of conspiracy, misappropriation of trade secrets,
violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, conversion, violation of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and violation of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act.
CALL argues the Tennessee Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them
because they have no present connection with the State of Tennessee.
CALL contends they have no offices, agents or contacts in Tennessee,
and have never conducted or solicited business in Tennessee. CALL
further argues that the allegedactivities were all conducted by ProM in
Louisiana. MedicOne argues that CALL’s Internet website is accessible
in Tennessee and has been accessed by Tennessee residents, thus
supporting the Court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over CALL.
In cases where the Defendant’s website is argued as the basis for the
court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, the temptation is for courts to turn
to the Zippo sliding scale to determine whether the website itself
demonstrates the appropriate level of interactivity to demonstrate
purposeful availment.126 However, the sliding scale is misdirection in cases
where the Internet activity involves purposeful behavior.127 If the court
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See Premedics v. Zoll, 2007 WL 3012968 (M.D. Tenn., Oct. 9, 2007)(NO.3:060716) (“Undoubtedly, the determination of purposeful availment becomes more
challenging when applied to situations involving the use of the internet. The prevalence and
scope of the internet allows individuals to communicate, conduct business, or casually
browse across state lines and international borders without leaving their desk. Information
once part and parcel to transactions, such as knowledge of another party's physical location,
is no longer a prerequisite to communication. Federal courts have applied a specific
analysis in determining whether a defendant's internet activity constitutes purposeful
availment, commonly referred to as the ‘Zippo sliding scale.’”)
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See id. at 11(“However, the sliding scale approach is not applicable in every case
merely because facts touch on internet activity. Rather, the Zippo analysis is appropriately
applied in personal jurisdiction inquiries where the facts center on the defendant's activities
conducted through its own website.”)
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utilizes the sliding scale analysis and looks to the number of hits on CALL’s
website from Tennessee residents and the amount of revenue received from
sales in Tennessee, the court may completely overlook the fact that CALL
intentionally accessed MedicOne’s website for the purpose of reverse
engineering MedicOne’s web-based product.128
The facts of the hypothetical case parallel a pre-Internet scenario where
one vendor travels to another state to buy a competitor’s product, then takes
the product back to its own shop for use as a model to create a rival product.
In the pre-Internet scenario, the acts of traveling to another state and
purchasing a product for an improper purpose would be sufficient to
demonstrate purposeful availment. The fact that modern actors use the
Internet as a means for the same end should not alter the analysis.
If the court were to focus on CALL’s website and its placement on the
sliding scale, the result of the case may be highly illogical. It is possible
that when placed on the sliding scale, the CALL website would fail to meet
the necessary level of interactivity to establish personal jurisdiction over
CALL in Tennessee.129 A misdirected focus on the defendant’s website can
overtake the heart of the plaintiff’s allegations, the defendant’s purposeful
128
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act. When the same facts are analyzed through the place theory framework,
the court would focus on first determining the defendant’s contacts with the
forum state, then on whether those contacts demonstrate purposeful
availment.130 In this hypothetical, the contacts include CALL’s entry into a
contract with MedicOne, a Tennessee company, CALL’s access of
MedicOne’s website, CALL’s receipt of e-mails from MedicOne’s site, and
any and all other interactions with MedicOne. These contacts demonstrate
purposeful availment as CALL’s contact with the MedicOne website, on its
own and through its agent ProM, were undertaken for the purpose of reverse
engineering the MedicOne technology. Under the place theory framework,
CALL’s actions should be analyzed as the electronic version of a product
purchase for the same improper motive.131 The place theory framework
supports the logical conclusion that CALL would be subject to personal
jurisdiction in Tennessee; however the sliding scale analysis may reach the
opposite result by focusing on CALL’s website rather than its actions.
IV. CONCLUSION
All things new do not require new things. The Zippo sliding scale is
itself the most compelling example of why functional doctrine should not be
supplanted to address the societal changes brought forth through
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technology.The scale is a naïve device to categorize Internet sites on a
linear continuum for the purpose of assessing whether the attributes of a
website suggest conduct directed at the forum. Despite invocation of the
scale by courts and litigants as a device for analyzing the forum’s
constitutional reach, the scale itself offers no framework for evaluating
purposeful activity within the forum. In contrast, place theory allows courts
and litigants to analyze an Internet-based contacts case through the vertical
constitutional framework defined and refined through over one hundred
years of precedent.
The addition of the sliding scale onto the house of personal jurisdiction
already appears dated and the house itself suffers under the structural stress
of the scale. Courts should abandon the sliding scale and return to the place
theory analytical framework when analyzing Internet-based contacts,
thereby preparing litigants to address the inevitable next technological
change on the global horizon.

***

